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  How do media affect voting behavior? What difference can an independent media outlet 
make in a country with state-controlled media? Our paper addresses these questions by 
comparing electoral outcomes and votes reported by survey respondents during the 1999 
parliamentary elections in Russia for those geographical areas that had access and those that had 
no access to the only national TV channel independent from the government (“NTV”). The 
effect is identified from exogenous variation in the availability of the signal, which appears to be 
mostly idiosyncratic, conditional on controls. The findings are as follows. 1) The presence of the 
independent TV channel decreased the aggregate vote for the government party by 2.5 
percentage points and increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 2.1 
percentage points. 2) The probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals 
who watched NTV even controlling for voting intentions measured one month prior to the 
elections. 3) NTV had a smaller effect on votes of people with higher political knowledge and 
those using alternative sources of political news and a larger effect on retired persons who watch 
TV substantially more than working individuals.   
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“Contrary to a common perception, mass media is 
an instrument, rather than an institution,” – 
Vladimir Putin said to the director of an independent 
radio station Echo Moscow
1. 
1. Introduction 
  In August 1999, Vladimir Putin, whose popularity rating was below 2% at that time, was 
appointed prime minister of Russia by the first president Boris Yeltsin. Eight months later, he 
won the March 2000 Presidential elections in the first round with 52.9% of the vote.  Just before 
that, during the December 1999 Russia’s Parliamentary elections, the new pro-government party, 
“Unity,” which was created less than two months prior to the election, scored second with 23.3% 
of the total vote. Scholars and journalists hypothesized that the massive and well-organized 
media campaign by state-owned television played a crucial role in these successes (Colton and 
McFaul, 2003, Oates, 2006). Can mass media have such a substantial effect on political 
outcomes; and if yes, in what circumstances?  
A large body of evidence (surveyed below) suggests that media has an important but – in 
terms of magnitude – rather small effect on political outcomes in established democracies with 
stable party systems, ideological platforms of parties, which are well known to voters, and 
competitive media. However, one should expect a larger effect of media on political outcomes in 
a country characterized by weak democratic institutions. For instance, in the 1990s, Russia’s 
party system was very unstable with many short-lived parties coming and going. Voters had little 
prior information about these parties and, therefore, had to put substantial weight on any new 
information about the parties, which, in turn, was provided mostly by mass media. Parties also 
ran on platforms with vague ideology; so that their differences were unclear to voters. As a 
result, issues not related to policy such as candidate's valence became important elements in 
voting decisions. Finally, competition in Russia’s media market was imperfect: in many regions 
all major media outlets were controlled by the government, and voters only had access to one-
sided political coverage.
2  
Despite the overall success of the new pro-government party “Unity” in the 1999 Russian 
parliamentary elections, the success was far from uniform across the country.  For example, the 
party received less than 14% of the vote in the city of Perm and more than 32% in the city of 
Voronezh.
  We show that to a large extent this relates to variation in voters’ access to an 
                                                 
1 As reported by Alexei Venedictov,  editor in chief of Echo Moscow, at a public lecture in the New Economic 
School on February 26, 2009. 
2 In countries like the U.S. with relatively free and competitive media, persuasion effects of media are mitigated by 
consumers' ability to self-select or to choose the most preferred media outlet (Durante and Knight, 2009). People in 
countries with controlled media market do not have such options. Therefore, they are likely to discount the 
information received from the biased media to a larger extent than consumers in the competitive media market. Such 
a discount, however, is unlikely to undo the persuasion effect completely (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). 
  2independent media outlet in different parts of the country. Indeed, if the governing party controls 
a vast majority of media sources, access to an alternative source of information can be important 
in helping people to make informative choices.
3 In particular, we estimate the impact of the only 
independent national TV channel, NTV, on voting behavior during the Russian 1999 
Parliamentary elections. We use the idiosyncratic geographical variation in the availability of the 
NTV signal to identify the effect. Using both the official statistics on election results and 
individual survey data, we show that access to an independent TV channel significantly 
increased vote for opposition parties and decreased vote for the pro-government party, “Unity.”  
We investigate two types of effects. First, we analyze the aggregate effects of having 
NTV transmission at the subregional level (analogous to U.S. counties), using the official 
electoral results. Second, we use data from a large-scale representative panel survey to 
investigate the media effects on the individual level, using access to NTV as an instrument for 
NTV exposure. We find large and significant effects of NTV on the voting outcomes. Due to the 
NTV broadcast, the pro-government party lost 2.5 percentage points of votes (9% of the 
aggregate vote for the party), while the main opposition parties, in sum, got an additional 2.1 
percentage points of the total vote (10% of the aggregate vote for these parties). Using individual 
level data, we find that exposure to NTV had a significant effect on individual votes in favor of 
the main opposition party (supported by NTV), even controlling for voting intentions measured 
one month prior to the elections. NTV had a particularly large negative effect on the vote for the 
pro-government party among voters who were undecided a month before elections. We also find 
that the effect of NTV was weaker for people who used newspapers as an alternative source of 
political information as well as for people who had a high level of political knowledge before the 
elections. The positive effect of NTV on the support of the main opposition party was stronger 
for less educated, older and retired people. 
An important step in our analysis is to show that the availability of the NTV signal was 
idiosyncratic, i.e. that there were no unobserved characteristics of subregions with and without 
the NTV signal that could drive the observed differences in voting behavior. First, we show that 
the presence of NTV in the 1999 elections does not correlate with voting choice in previous 
parliamentary elections held in 1995, once observable economic characteristics of regions are 
controlled for. Second, and most importantly, we conducted placebo regressions for the effects 
of NTV on voting behavior in 1995 and 2003, two elections in which there were no significant 
differences between the political coverage of different national TV channels. We find that 
though the availability of NTV in 1999 had a large effect on voting behavior in 1999, it did not 
                                                 
3 McMillan and Zoido (2004) show that the existence of a single independent TV channel can threaten the stability 
of a corrupt regime. Their findings suggest that the presence of an independent media channel could, potentially, 
help to keep the government accountable and the elections competitive. 
  3have any effect on the vote in 1995 and 2003. The results of this placebo experiment suggest that 
some unobservable characteristics of subregions, which could be correlated with voting choice, 
cannot explain our main findings. 
In the analysis of aggregate media effects, our approach is similar to that of DellaVigna 
and Kaplan (2007) in their investigation of the impact of Fox News on the voting behavior of 
Americans, using idiosyncratic diffusion of Fox News before the 2000 U.S. election. With 
respect to the availability of Fox News, they find a positive effect of 0.5 percentage point on the 
vote for Republicans, whereas we find a 2.5 percentage point negative effect of the NTV signal 
on the vote for the pro-government party. Such a large difference in the magnitude of the effects 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the weakness of democratic institutions leads to greater 
media persuasion effect.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review related literature. 
Section 3 provides background information on the television market and political situation in 
Russia at the end of the 1990s. In section 4, we formulate our hypotheses and describe the data. 
Section 5 presents aggregate-level results and discusses validity of the instrument. Section 6 
presents individual-level results. We conclude in section 7. 
2. Literature 
The literature on the effects of media on voting behavior is expanding rapidly. Early 
classic studies (e.g., Berelson et al. 1944 and Lazarsfeld et al. 1954) find no effect of media on 
voting once political predispositions of survey respondents are taken into account and argue that 
media does not persuade voters but only reinforces their existing preferences. These studies, 
however, suffer from severe endogeneity problem: survey respondents prefer media sources 
which reflect their political views. More recent contributions to the literature employ 
experimental and quasi-experimental approaches to deal with inherent endogeneity of survey-
based studies and show that media does affect voting behavior.
4  
Most of the evidence comes from established democracies and points to the effect of 
media on voting outcomes through its effect on turnout. For instance, Strömberg (2004) finds 
that an increase in the penetration of local radio stations in the United States in the 1930s 
increased turnout. Gentzkow (2006) finds that the introduction of television in 1940s-1950s in 
the United States significantly decreased turnout, as people read fewer newspapers and received 
less political information. George and Waldfogel (2006) use penetration of the New York Times 
                                                 
4 An additional body of research, not using quasi-experimental methods, looks at the consequences of the 
differences in the freedom of media across countries. The lack of media freedom is found to be associated with state 
media ownership (Djankov et al. 2003), resource curse and low incentives for bureaucracy (Egorov et al. 2006), low 
level of social spending (Petrova 2007), and high corruption (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
  4in 1990s to show that it decreased turnout in local elections because of a “distraction” of college-
educated voters from local media and local affairs. Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2007) show 
that local news channels in Spanish in the United States increase turnout of Spanish-speaking 
electorate. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) use idiosyncratic diffusion of Fox News to show that it 
affected the vote for Republicans in the 2000 elections, mainly through increased turnout among 
Republican supporters. In contrast to other studies, Gerber et al. (2007) find a substantial effect 
of the access to the Washington Post on the voting behavior in a Washington D.C. gubernatorial 
election directly (rather than through turnout). They conducted a randomized experiment by 
providing individuals with a free subscription to the Washington Times or the Washington Post 
and show that those who received either paper were 8% more likely to vote for Democrats. 
Strömberg and Snyder (2008) use variation in overlap of congressional districts and local media 
markets resulting from redistricting to show that coverage by local media affects behavior of the 
politicians and, as a result, public policies.  
The evidence on the effects of media on voting outside the developed world is scarce. 
Several recent papers start to fill this gap and our paper contributes to this emerging strand of the 
literature. These studies suggest that media, in addition to affecting turnout, have a substantial 
effect on political preferences in regimes other than advanced democracies. Using survey data, 
Lawson and McCann (2007) show that before the 2000 elections in Mexico, TV news had a 
significant effect on attitudes and vote choices.  Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) argue that biased 
media in Arabic countries reinforce anti-Americanism.  McMillan and Zoido (2004) provide a 
detailed account on how the media was used to undermine democratic accountability in Peru. 
Haimueller and Kern (2007) show that the availability of free West German TV increased 
support of the authoritarian regime in East Germany by providing otherwise-missing 
entertainment to East Germans. Colton and McFaul (2003) emphasize the importance of media 
effects for the outcomes of Russian elections in 1999 and 2000 using a survey-based approach.
5  
Our paper is closely related to White et al. (2005). They also try to estimate the effect of 
Russian media on the results of the 1999 parliamentary and 2000 presidential elections and find a 
significant media exposure effect on voting results. White et al., however, use the self-reported 
vote choice and the self-reported presence of state-owned or commercial television from a 2001 
                                                 
5 Furthermore, recent papers find direct effects of media on public policy. Strömberg (2004) finds that in the U.S. in 
the 1930s radio diffusion in a county was positively correlated with the level of public expenditures in the region. 
Einesee and Strömberg (2007) show that the amount of media coverage, instrumented by the timing of external 
newsworthy events, such as the Olympics, affects U.S. aid on disaster relief. Besley and Burgess (2002) find that in 
India the newspaper circulation in a state is an important factor which influences the government's responsiveness to 
food shortages and floods. Reinikka and Svensson (2005) show that in Uganda the amount of public spending 
reaching local schools was higher when the intended amount of funding was publicized in local newspapers. In 
addition, mass media has important effects on other forms of behavior (Olken, 2008; La Ferrara et al, 2008; Jensen 
and Oster, 2007). 
  5survey conducted 18 months after the elections. This methodology is subject to severe 
endogeneity problems.
6 Our approach is superior from a methodological perspective because it 
allows us to evaluate the size of the causal effect of NTV on voting decisions. Furthermore, in 
addition to the analysis of self-reported individual voting behavior, we document the effect of 
NTV on the aggregate electoral outcomes using official electoral statistics.
7  
3. Background information 
Politics 
Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s political landscape was constantly changing (see, e.g., 
White et al 1995, 1997; Brader and Tucker 2001). New parties were forming and then 
disappearing. The number of parties participating in parliamentary elections was 13 in 1993, 43 
in 1995, and 26 in 1999. Partisan attachments were weak, with the exception of Communist 
Party supporters. According to Colton (2000), 71% of voters changed their preferred party 
between 1993 and 1995; for 60% of voters, this change came with a substantial change in 
ideology.
8 Less than one fourth of voters chose the same party in 1995 and 1999 parliamentary 
elections (Colton and McFaul 2003). To sum up, 1990s Russia had an unstable party system and 
lacked developed partisan attachments.
9 
Prior to the 2004 political reform, the lower house of the Russia’s parliament (Duma) was 
formed by a mixed electoral rule. One half of all seats (225 deputies) was chosen in single-
member-district majoritarian elections and the other half of the seats was filled by party-lists 
voting in a single national district according to a proportional representation formula with a 5% 
entry barrier. In our empirical analysis, we focus on the party-list vote in the December 1999 
Duma elections.  
On September 27, 1999, a new electoral party “Unity” (“Edinstvo” in Russian) was 
created.  The leaders of the party officially stated that it has no ideology other than to support the 
                                                 
6 Survey respondents, whose choice was affected by media, tend to remember their vote choice better; survey 
respondents not interested in watching a particular channel do not know whether it is available. In addition, as 
identified by Colton and McFaul (2003), Russian citizens tend to forget their past vote choices: in their survey, 
around half of the respondents in 1999 either did not remember their vote in 1995 at all or recalled a vote that was 
different from that reported immediately after the 1995 elections. 
7 We cannot compare the magnitudes of the estimated effects in our paper and theirs, as they do not report marginal 
effects for their logit regressions. 
8 Colton classified all Russian parties into 6 different groups by their ideology: liberal, socialist, centrist, nationalist, 
government and miscellaneous.  60% of survey respondents chose different party families in 1993 and 1995. 
9 Such regimes are often referred to as “partial democracies.” According to Epstein et al. (2006) these are regimes 
which possess some (but not all) properties of full democracies. They also are sometimes called “young” or 
“immature” democracies as they are typically newly created and later either evolve to established, consolidated 
democracies or return back to authoritarian types of government. These regimes usually have elections, but the 
competitiveness and fairness of these elections is questionable at best. 
  6government and its head, Vladimir Putin.
10 In October 1999, the most popular party was the 
opposition party called OVR (“Fatherland – All Russia”), which had centrist ideology and based 
its campaign on criticizing the government. It was created in August 1999 from a coalition of the 
existing parties “Fartherland” and “All Russia.” According to polls two months before the 
elections, OVR was expected to get 29% and KPRF (the Communist Party) 21% of the total 
vote.
11 The results of the December 1999 election were sharply different from these forecasts: 
KPRF was first with 24.3%, pro-government “Unity” second with 23.3%, and the main 
opposition party, OVR third with only 13.3%.
12 The other three parties that overcame the 5% 
electoral threshold were liberal SPS and Yabloko, and nationalistic LDPR (8.5%, 5.9%, and 
6.0%, respectively).   
Mass Media 
What accounts for the change in voter preferences which happened in the fall of 1999? 
Colton and MacFaul (2003) conjecture that a skilled PR campaign with the massive support of 
state-owned TV channels caused this “reversal of fortunes.” Indeed, during the electoral 
campaign of 1999, television played a very important role in dissemination of political 
information to the population: according to a representative survey of Russia’s voters, 89% said 
that television was their “basic source of information about political events,” compared with 8% 
of the population who named radio, and 3% who named newspapers (Colton and McFaul 2003; 
see also White and Oates 2003). 
There were three major national TV channels in 1999 that broadcasted political news. 
The state controlled the two main channels, ORT and RTR.  The third major channel, NTV 
(“Independent TV”), was a commercial network owned by Vladimir Gusinsky, a tycoon who 
was not close to Yeltsin or Putin.
13  
The broadcast of political news on all major national channels was unbalanced: both 
state-owned channels were biased towards pro-government Unity, while NTV was biased 
towards opposition OVR.
14 The political news coverage on both state-controlled channels was 
uneven both in terms of the amount of time allocated to different parties and the content of 
                                                 
10 The leader of “Unity,” Sergei Shoigu, then the minister of emergency situations, said about the ideology of the 
newly created movement: “We do not bind ourselves to any narrow ideological direction. We are not ‘centrists’, 
‘rightists’, or ‘leftists.’ We are a party of consolidation of all healthy forces in society, free of ideological bias.” 
Here “healthy forces” meant support of Putin’s government and Putin himself. Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
December 8, 1999, as cited in Colton and MacFaul (2003). 
11 Foundation “Obschestvennoe mnenie,” 20.10.1999 http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/policy/party_rating/o907003 
12 It is worth noting that after one and a half years, in April 2001, “Unity” and OVR, former fierce competitors, 
united to create “United Russia” party, which became the main “party of power” in Russia for the 2003 and 2007 
elections. 
13 The other three TV channels with national status were either much smaller as “TV-Tsentr” and “TV-6” or did not 
cover politics as “Cultura.” 
14 The political biases of the media channels were inferred by the Institute of the European Media based on a content 
analysis (Oates, 2000). 
  7broadcasted messages. The content of NTV programs was sharply different from that of the 
state-controlled TV channels. NTV programs criticized the Putin government, supported the 
main opposition party, OVR, and were friendly to liberal pro-reform parties, SPS and Yabloko. 
Despite the fact that many analysts found its coverage to be more fair, as compared with other 




The broadcasting infrastructure in Russia was largely inherited from the Soviet era. The 
two state channels, ORT and RTR, were the successors to the two main Soviet channels 
accessible to almost 100% of the population. NTV channel was created in 1993 as a small, 
privately owned news channel. At the end of 1996 it was granted the whole broadcasting 
infrastructure of the national educational channel which ceased to exist at that time. To a small 
extent, NTV expanded the area that could receive its signal between 1996 and 1999, but the 
availability of the signal in 1999 was still primarily based on the inherited infrastructure. This 
increase in the area covered by the NTV signal was determined primarily by the availability of 
transmitters whereas the choice of location for the channel’s transmitters was driven by the 
whims of the Soviet central planning system rather than by any strategic considerations.
16 
According to summary statistics (presented in Table 1), as one would expect, in 1999 the channel 
was more frequently available in populous, educated, urban areas with developed infrastructure. 
In 1999, approximately two thirds of Russia’s population could watch NTV. Thus, one 
third of voters located in parts of the country where NTV was not accessible were treated with 
one-sided media coverage (by state channels, ORT and RTR), while the two thirds of voters in 
the other parts of the country that had access to NTV could receive media coverage from both 
sides of the political struggle.
17  
4. Empirical hypotheses and the data 
Hypotheses 
In 1999 a substantial part of Russia’s population did not have access to any news source 
other than the official pro-government channel, which provided strongly biased coverage of 
                                                 
15 One of the two state channels, ORT, positively covered Unity 28% of the time and its party leader Shoigu 19% of 
the time, with OVR and Luzhkov getting extremely negative coverage 9% and 4% of the time, respectively (Oates 
2000, 2006). The other state channel, RTR, covered Unity 24% of the time, and OVR 13% of the time, in addition to 
the heavy coverage of Unity leader Shoigu and Prime Minister Putin (Oates 2000).  NTV covered OVR 33% of a 
time and Unity only 5% of a time. 
16 Source: authors’ interview with the former anchor and general director of NTV, Evgeny Kiselev. 
17 NTV had a satellite transmission that was available in all the Russian territory, but the share of population using 
this service was minuscule (at the beginning of 2000 there were only 110,000 subscribers – less than 1% of voters). 
  8electoral campaign. As the availability of a source of information with a bias in the opposite 
direction can prove to be extremely important in shaping political views of electorate, we expect 
to find a large effect of the availability of NTV on voting behavior. 
The main hypothesis is that there is a significant positive effect of the availability of NTV 
on voting for all parties that were supported by NTV (centrist opposition, OVR, and liberal 
opposition, Yabloko and SPS) and a significant negative effect of NTV on the vote for pro-
government Unity, which was criticized by NTV and praised by other national channels. We 
expect to see these effects both at the aggregate and individual level. For parties that got similar 
coverage by NTV and state TV channels (Communists, KPRF, and nationalists, LDPR), we 
expect to see no effect of NTV.  
We also expect that the voting behavior of people who use alternative sources of 
information regarding political news (such as radio and newspapers) will be less influenced by 
the availability of NTV. Similarly, we expect that people who possess better political knowledge 
before the elections will be less influenced by NTV, since these people have stronger prior 
opinions regarding political parties and are less likely to be affected by any new information, 
including the one provided by NTV. In addition, groups of the population who have more time to 
watch TV, e.g, the retired, are expected to be affected more by NTV’s presence. 
 
Data Sources 
We use four primary sources of data. First, data on NTV signal availability for 1997 and 
1999 are courtesy of the Video International, a major Russian media advertising company. Using 
these data, we created a subregion-level dummy variable NTV, which is equal to 1 if NTV was 
available in that subregion and 0 otherwise.
18 There are no subregions with partial treatment. The 
availability is calculated by Video International based on the location of NTV transmitters. A 
subregion is assumed to have NTV if an NTV transmitter was located in this subregion. This 
measure is imperfect, since in subregions with no transmitters, one could receive the NTV signal 
from the neighboring subregions and, in some subregions with transmitters, a part of the 
subregion did not have the signal because of insufficient transmitter power or geographical 
obstacles (such as mountains). Despite these imperfections, the quality of the data as a proxy for 
measuring NTV audience was considered sufficiently high by a major advertising agency to set 
prices for advertisements on the channel based on this information. As we show below, NTV 
dummy is highly correlated with the proportion of people who report watching NTV. 
                                                 
18 In Russia, all 89 regions are divided into subregions, which are administrative districts, similar to counties in the 
United States. A typical subregion is an urban or rural area with a population of 200 to 300 thousand people. 
  9Second, data on electoral outcomes are from the Central Election Commission of the 
Russian Federation. Specifically, we use the data on voting results and turnout at the level of 
electoral districts (officially, Local Electoral Commissions) for the party-list voting in the Duma 
elections of 1995, 1999, and 2003. If needed, we aggregated votes from different electoral 
districts to get voting results at the subregional level.
19  
Third, we use data on socioeconomic conditions of subregions for the year 1998 from 
Rosstat, the official Russian statistical agency. As socioeconomic controls for the aggregate level 
of analysis, we use the following variables: logarithm of population, population change, 
migration rate, log of average wage, average pension, fraction of retired people, fraction of 
unemployed, number of people employed in farms, and crime rate. 
Finally, we use data from a representative multiregional survey of voters from Colton 
(2000) and Colton and McFaul (2003).  The survey is a large-scale panel survey of the Russian 
electorate held before the 1999 parliamentary elections, after the 1999 parliamentary elections, 
and after the 2000 presidential elections, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences.  The nationally representative panel consists of 1783 respondents from 41 
subregions in 28 regions. The survey instruments included questions on respondents’ socio-
demographic characteristics, political preferences, and the sources of political information. In 
particular, respondents reported what TV channels and programs they watched. Based on these 
questions, we construct an individual-level dummy (Watches_NTV) equal to 1 if the respondent 
watched either daily news or weekly news magazine on NTV “almost every day” or “from time 
to time.”  
Summary Statistics 
Aggregate-level data 
Our dataset contains 425 subregions with NTV signal and 1682 subregions without NTV 
signal. In 1999, the NTV signal was available in 20% of the subregions and 52% of the 
population. Summary statistics for socio-economic characteristics of subregions with and 
without NTV signal are presented in Table 1 along with summary statistics for the election 
results in 1995 and 1999. Subregions with higher population and higher income were more likely 
to get the NTV signal. For the other control variables, the availability of the NTV signal was not 
significantly affected by observables. The map of NTV availability is given in Figure 1. The 
figure illustrates that the NTV signal was more or less evenly dispersed throughout the country, 
with the exception of a higher density of subregions with NTV around very big cities like 
                                                 
19 There were 2724 Local Electoral Commissions (“Territorialnye Izbiratelnye Komissii”) during the 1999 
Parliamentary elections. For the vast majority of subregions, they coincide with electoral districts; but some large 
subregions (typically, bigger cities) are divided into several electoral districts. 
  10Moscow and lower density of subregions with NTV in low-populated areas in Siberia. We 
exclude Moscow and St. Petersburg from the sample because they are clear outliers in the 
individual-level analysis and because there is no variation in NTV signal within these 
metropolitan areas, which have the status of regions, whereas our main specification includes 
regional fixed effects. 
Election results are different in subregions with and without NTV both in 1995 and 1999. 
This comparison, however, is based on the unconditional means and does not take into account 
socio-economic differences among subregions and regional fixed effects. Below we present 
evidence that election results in 1995 are the same and election results in 1999 are vastly 
different for subregions with and without NTV once differences among subregions are accounted 
for, to show that a priori political preferences of electorate do not systematically differ for 
subregions with and without NTV. 
Individual-level data 
Table 2 summarizes the individual-level survey data. The first row of the table shows that 
the NTV dummy (which indicates availability of the NTV signal in a subregion) is an important, 
though not perfect, predictor of whether people located in this subregion report watching NTV. 
69% of respondents reported that they watch NTV in subregions coded as having the NTV signal 
and 49% of respondents reported that they watched NTV in subregions without the NTV signal 
(the difference is statistically significant). Why do people report watching NTV in subregions 
coded as not having NTV signal? There are several potential explanations. First, our measure of 
NTV signal availability is based on the existence of a transmitter in a given subregion, and, 
therefore, is imprecise. Second, some people receive satellite NTV signal. However, because of 
the very small number of satellite subscribers, satellite transmission cannot fully explain the 
discrepancy between individual data on watching NTV and subregional data on NTV signal 
availability. Third, TV receivers available to the population are of varying quality. Some people 
had high-quality antennas or signal amplifiers which allowed viewers to see NTV even if the 
signal was weak. Finally, a measurement error might also be an explanation. 
5. Aggregate-level results 
In order to test whether the presence of the NTV signal had an effect on aggregate voting 
outcomes in 1999 elections, we estimate the following model: 
ij r i i i
j
i S X NTV vote ε δ β β + + + + + = 1998 , 1995 , 1999 , 1 0 1999 , ' ' 3 2
β β
,    
where  i indexes subregions, vote
j
i,1999 is the percent of votes for party j at the 1999 Duma 
elections in subregion i,  NTVi,1999 is a dummy variable for the presence of NTV signal in 
  11subregion i in 1999, Xi,1995 is a vector of electoral outcomes in 1995 elections, Si,1998 is a set of 
socio-economic characteristics of subregion i  before the 1999 elections, and  r δ  are regional 
fixed effects. 
Table 3 presents regression results for the vote for major parties and voter turnout.
20 The 
vote for Unity, the pro-government party opposed by NTV, was significantly smaller in NTV 
subregions than in non-NTV subregions. The magnitude of the effect is large: the availability of 
the NTV signal in a subregion decreased the vote for Unity by approximately 2.5 percentage 
points.
21 This result is consistent with the hypothesis that NTV was a successful counterweight 
to the pro-government and pro-Unity propaganda broadcast by the two main state channels. The 
effect of the NTV signal on the combined vote for all three opposition parties, supported by this 
channel, is significantly positive. The effect of NTV on the vote for OVR is weaker than its 
effect on the vote for liberal parties (SPS and Yabloko). NTV signal increased the vote for OVR 
by 0.6 percentage points and for the two liberal parties by 1.6 percentage points. 
The aggregate size of the effect (-2.5 percentage points for Unity and comparable +2.1 
percentage points for three opposition parties combined) amounts to a change of one tenth of the 
vote received by these parties as a result of the NTV broadcast. This effect is notably greater 
than the effect of Fox News (0.5 percentage points) observed by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) 
in the U.S. In addition, Fox News in 2000 was available to 34% of U.S. population, while NTV 
was available to 66% of Russian population, which implies that the aggregate effect of NTV on 
the results of the elections at the national level is even stronger. Note, however, that this 
comparison should be taken with caution, as it is difficult to compare the extent of the media bias 
in Russia and in the U.S. 
We find no significant effect of NTV signal for the two parties which got the same 
coverage by NTV and the state channels, Communist KPRF and nationalist LDPR. This is 
consistent with the assumption about the similarity of NTV and non-NTV subregions conditional 
on observables which we tested formally in the next section. There is also no significant effect of 
NTV signal on the turnout after controlling for the 1995 election results. 
Our findings on the aggregate level data can be summarized as follows. The presence of 
NTV signal affected the vote for the parties which were covered differently by NTV and the two 
state channels. The sum of the positive effects on the vote for the three parties supported by NTV 
is approximately equal to the negative effect on the vote for the pro-government party Unity 
                                                 
20 For brevity we combine votes for the two liberal parties, Yabloko and SPS. The results are similar if we analyze 
vote for these two parties separately. 
21 Regressions presented in Table 3 put equal weight on all subregions. We have also estimated regressions weighted 
by subregional population; the size and statistical significance of the coefficients of interest are robust to such 
weighting (not reported). 
  12criticized by NTV. Probably, as a consequence, we find no effect of NTV on turnout. This 
suggests that voters persuaded by the state channels to vote for Unity came from the electorate of 
these three parties, rather than from the electorate of smaller parties or politically inactive groups 
of the population who, otherwise, would not have voted.  
Checking the validity of the instrument 
The key identifying assumption in our analysis is that the availability of NTV, controlling 
for observable characteristics of subregions, is uncorrelated with political preferences of voters 
other than through the effect of NTV. There are two potential reasons why this assumption may 
not hold. First, there might be reverse causality, as subregions with certain political preferences 
could be more likely to receive NTV. Second, there may have been some omitted characteristics 
of subregions that correlated both with the presence of the NTV signal and political preferences 
of the population. To test the validity of our main assumption, we conduct several checks. 
First, we examine whether the results of the previous parliamentary elections are 
correlated with NTV coverage in 1999 once we control for observables. If the availability of 
NTV is not correlated with pre-existing political preferences, which presumably persist over 
time, then voting outcomes in 1995 should not be correlated with the availability of NTV in 
1999. Table 4 presents results of regressions in which a dummy for having NTV signal in a 
subregion is regressed on voting results in 1995 and subregional characteristics. Without 
additional controls (columns 1 and 2), the availability of the NTV signal is significantly 
correlated with past vote choices. Columns 3 and 4, however, show that after controlling for such 
observable characteristics as population, education, and average wage, the presence of NTV is 
no longer significantly linked to voting outcomes in 1995. This is true both with and without 
controlling for the availability of NTV in the beginning of 1997. Once socio-economic controls 
are included, the joint significance of electoral variables sharply decreases (in columns 3 and 4, 
F-statistics for electoral controls are not significant even at 10% level, while F-statistics for 
socio-economic controls are significant at 1% level).   
Second, we conduct a placebo experiment. We exploit the fact that political coverage of 
NTV was different from all other national channels only during the parliamentary elections of 
1999, but was the same for all TV channels during the elections of 1995 and 2003. In 1995, NTV 
frequency and infrastructure still belonged to the national educational TV channel which did not 
cover politics. In 2003, after NTV was taken over by state monopoly Gazprom, the news 
coverage of the channel was no longer different from that of other national channels.  
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of estimating the effect of NTV availability in 1999 on 
the voting results of parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2003, respectively. The coefficients for 
  13NTV availability are small in size and statistically insignificant for all major parties and voter 
turnout for 1995 and 2003. There is only one exception: a small (much smaller that in 1999) but 
positive and significant effect of the NTV signal availability in 1999 on the vote for the liberal 
parties in 2003. It is important to note that, despite the fact that during the 2003 electoral 
campaign, political coverage of NTV was similar to the other major TV channels, the difference 
in the voting patterns in the 1999 elections could persist till 2003. Consistent with this 
explanation the effect becomes insignificant once we control for voting results in 1999.  
Another potential alternative explanation of our results is that the soviet educational 
channel, whose broadcasting infrastructure was inherited by NTV, had a lasting effect on the 
education of population, and therefore, NTV is a proxy for the level of education which, in turn, 
has an effect on voting behavior. We cannot directly control for education level of population at 
the aggregate level as there are no such data for subregions. There are, however, two reasons to 
believe that this is not what is driving our results. First, if the former educational channel were 
important, one would expect it to affect vote choices in 1995 and 2003 elections in addition to 
1999 elections; and this is not the case. Second, individual-level results in which we control for 
the level of education of voters (presented below) are similar to the aggregate-level results. 
Furthermore, education of the voter does not affect the likelihood of voting for OVR or Unity 
during the 1999 elections, although it does affect the vote for liberal parties. 
6. Individual-level results 
The analysis of individual-level data adds to the aggregate-level results in the following 
important respects. First, it allows us to estimate the persuasion effect of NTV controlling for 
individual characteristics. Second, it gives us an opportunity to examine the mechanism of the 
NTV effect.  In particular, we look separately at the effect of NTV on the voting decisions of 
undecided voters and those voters who had well-defined voting intentions during the pre-election 
survey. We also examine how the effect of NTV depends on individual characteristics of voters. 
Our basic model to estimate the effect of watching NTV on the reported vote is the 
following probit model: 
) ' ( ) 1 Pr( 1995 , 1999 , 1 0 1999 , ij i i
j
i X WatchesNTV vote ε β β + + + Φ = = 2
β
     ( 2 )  
where i indexes individual respondents and j indexes parties.  Dummy variable vote
j
i,1999 equals 1 
if respondent i reported voting for party j and zero if the respondent reported voting for some 
other party.  WatchesNTVi,1999 equals 1 if the respondent i reported watching  news programs on 
NTV in 1999 and zero otherwise. Xi,1999 is a set of individual and subregional level 
  14characteristics.
22 Since self-reported measure of media exposure (i.e., WatchesNTVi,1999) is 
subject to significant reporting biases and may be endogenous to vote choice (Price and Zaler 
1993, Prior 2007), one cannot consistently estimate the effect of watching NTV without a source 
of exogenous variation. To cope with this problem we instrument reported exposure to NTV 
programs by our measure of the geographical availability of NTV signal. Thus, WatchesNTVi,1999  
is instrumented by the availability of the NTV signal in the home subregion of individual i. 
Table 7 presents the results of the first stage regressions for two specifications: 
controlling and not controlling for voting intention before 1999 elections. In both specifications, 
the availability of the NTV signal is a strong predictor for the respondents’ exposure to NTV 
programs (F-statistics for the excluded instrument is 21.9 without the controls for voting 
intention and 7.26 with the controls for voting intentions).  
Table 8 presents the results of the second stage regressions. The coefficients on our main 
variable of interest, WatchesNTVi,1999, in the second stage are the estimates of the causal effect of 
watching NTV on the reported vote for a particular party. There is a significant effect of 
watching NTV on the reported vote for the main opposition party supported by NTV (OVR) and 
the pro-government party opposed by NTV (Unity). Marginal effects imply that survey 
respondents who watched NTV were 49 percentage points more likely to vote for OVR, and 42 
percentage points less likely to vote for Unity. The coefficients of interest for votes for other 
parties and election turnout are insignificant. 
Note that individual-level results presented in Table 8 differ from the aggregate-level 
results presented in Table 3 in several important respects.  First, the results for the effect of 
watching NTV on the reported vote for OVR and Unity are substantially larger in magnitude 
than aggregate-level (reduced form) effects of the NTV signal on official voting results. Second, 
in the aggregate-level results, the effect of the NTV signal on the actual vote for the main 
opposition party, OVR, is the smallest in magnitude, whereas in the individual-level analysis the 
marginal effect of NTV on the reported vote for OVR is the largest. Third, in contrast to the 
aggregate-level results, using the survey data, we find that the reported vote for the liberal parties 
was not significantly affected by watching NTV. There are several potential methodological 
explanations for these discrepancies between the aggregate- and individual-level results:  
(1) Most importantly, the individual-level results represent the local average treatment 
effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994), i.e., the effect of watching NTV only on those people who 
                                                 
22 Individual social and demographic characteristics include: sex, age, marital status, dummy for ethnic Russian, 
education (dummy for college education or higher), religiosity (answer to the question: Do you attend regularly 
religious services?), dummy for former membership in CPSU, and consumption index. We follow Colton and 
McFaul (2003) to construct the consumption index as the sum of the answers to the following consumption 
questions: Do you own a car? A dacha (summer home)? A computer? A phone? An automatic washing machine? 
Do you have Internet access? Have you ever been abroad? 
  15watched NTV just because it was available, in other words, only for those individuals whose 
viewing habits were affected by the availability of NTV. It is reasonable to expect that the effect 
of NTV for this particular group of people is higher than for the average for the whole 
population, which may explain the difference in the magnitudes of the effects. 
(2) In contrast to the aggregate-level analysis, in the individual-level regressions we 
cannot control for regional fixed effects as the survey typically was administered in only one 
subregion of each region, so that there is no within-region variation of NTV availability in the 
individual-level sample. Unobserved regional variation is likely to play an important role, since 
there is a substantial difference in ethnic, religious, economic, and political characteristics among 
Russia’s regions. For example, most regional governors were active supporters of either the main 
opposition party, OVR, or the government-supported party. Thus, the political preferences of the 
governor could have had a noticeable effect on the outcome of the election in the respective 
region and on the preferences of the regional population over which TV channels to view. The 
comparison of the aggregate-level results with and without regional fixed effects (results are not 
reported) indicates that the omission of regional fixed effects leads to a twofold increase in the 
estimated effect of the NTV signal on the vote for OVR and a fourfold increase in the effect on 
the vote for Unity. Therefore, omitting regional fixed effects can explain some differences in 
magnitude between aggregate and individual level results. 
(3) Since the individual-level data are available only for a subsample of regions, one 
should worry about whether the sample of regions is representative, as the survey designers 
claim. To verify the representativeness of the survey data, we checked that aggregate-level 
results for the subsample of regions where survey data were collected are quantitatively very 
similar to the results for the whole sample.  
In Tables 9 and 10, we report the results of our investigation of the mechanisms behind 
the NTV influence on political persuasion. In Table 10, we decompose the effect of NTV into 
the effect on those voters who had formulated some voting intentions before the 1999 elections 
and on undecided voters (i.e., those voters who did not answer which party they were going to 
vote for in the pre-election survey, but answered which party they voted for in the post-election 
survey). The results indicate that even after we control for voters’ intention to vote just a month 
before the election, the exposure to NTV made people 51 percentage points more likely to vote 
for OVR, the main opposition party supported by NTV. In contrast, for government-supported 
Unity, the similar result, controlling for pre-election voting intentions, is insignificant. Whereas, 
for the subsample of undecided voters, the effect of NTV on the vote for Unity is large and 
significant at 1% level. The marginal effect implies that the exposure to NTV made undecided 
viewers 47 percentage points less likely to vote for Unity.  
  16Finally, we investigate how the effect of watching NTV on the reported vote depends on 
individual characteristics of respondents. We focus only on the effect of NTV on the reported 
vote for OVR and Unity, the main parties for which NTV affected individual votes in our data. 
Table 10 presents the results of this analysis.
23 First, we look at how the effect of NTV depends 
on whether respondents use other sources of political information. Results indicate that the effect 
of NTV on the vote for OVR and Unity is lower for people who read political articles in 
newspapers (columns 1 and 2). However, the effect is the same for people who receive political 
information from radio (columns 3 and 4). This difference can be explained by the fact that on 
most radios the coverage of political news is very short and superfluous, whereas newspaper 
articles are usually more informative. As a result, only information received from newspapers 
serves as a real alternative to the information received from TV.  
Columns 5 and 6 explore the effect of political knowledge which the respondents possess 
prior to elections.
24 The effect of NTV on the vote for OVR was smaller for people with a high 
level of prior political knowledge. The effect on the vote for Unity is also smaller for the 
respondents with a high level of political knowledge, but not statistically significant. These 
results are also consistent with our hypothesis that people who have better political knowledge 
and thus stronger prior opinions are less influenced by mass media.  
The results in columns 1-6 cannot be unambiguously interpreted as the evidence of causal 
relationship, since the fact that a person uses alternative sources of political information or has 
better political knowledge is itself endogenous. They do, however, provide suggestive evidence 
consistent with the premise that people with access to additional sources of information are more 
difficult to persuade. 
Next we examine how the effect of NTV depends on such individual characteristics as 
education, age, and whether a person is retired. The results are presented in the last six columns 
of Table 10. There is some evidence that the effect of NTV on the vote for OVR was smaller for 
people who have finished high school, although there is no significant effect for the vote for 
Unity. The results also indicate that the effect of NTV on the vote for OVR was significantly 
stronger for both older and retired voters. The likely reason for such an effect is that older and 
especially retired people in Russia tend to watch more TV and, as a result, the effect of NTV for 
                                                 
23 We report the results of the reduced-form model in which we use dummy variable for the availability of NTV as a 
regressor instead of using it as an instrument since we could not achieve convergence in the instrumented 
regressions. The reason for this seems to be the binary nature of both our measure of NTV availability and 
individual characteristics used in the interaction term. The first stage for the interaction term in instrumental 
regressions can not be robustly estimated.  
24 Political knowledge is measured as the number of correct answers to ten questions that inquired about the office 
that a certain politician occupied and the identity of recent prime ministers.  
  17them is stronger. Note that our data indicates that older and retired people are less likely to 
switch their vote from their intended vote prior to the election.  
In sum, the results for the individual preferences over major political parties are 
consistent with those for the aggregate level data. IV regressions show that the effect of exposure 
to NTV on the vote for OVR was positive, and the effect of exposure to NTV on the vote for 
Unity was negative. NTV was able to affect the vote choice even during only one month of 
political campaign before the elections. Voters were 51 percentage points more likely to vote for 
OVR if they were exposed to NTV even controlling for their voting intentions just a month 
before the elections. Also, undecided voters were 47 percentage points less likely to vote for 
Unity if they watched NTV. Prior political knowledge and exposure to alternative sources of 
political news decreased the persuasion effect of NTV, whereas the extent of the exposure 
(proxied by retirement) increased the persuasion effect of NTV. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we document the effects of media on voting outcomes in Russia’s 
parliamentary elections of 1999. We base our identification on the variation in the geographical 
availability of NTV, the only major TV channel which at that time was independent from the 
government. This allows us to isolate the effect of exposure to media on voting behavior and to 
avoid endogeneity biases inherent in survey-based studies. At the aggregate level of analysis, we 
find that the effect of NTV was positive and significant for three parties supported by NTV. 
Together, these parties got 2.1 percentage points more votes in an average subregion with the 
NTV signal. This amounts to an additional one tenth of the combined vote received by these 
parties as a result of the NTV broadcast. At the same time, pro-government Unity party got 2.5 
percentage points fewer votes in an average subregion with the NTV signal. This amounts to a 
total loss of about one tenth in the total vote received by the pro-government party.  
Using survey data, we find that even controlling for the voting intentions just a month 
before the elections, NTV had a substantial effect on the vote for the major opposition party 
supported by NTV. Thus, NTV was able to persuade its viewers to vote for this party despite 
their initial voting intentions just before the elections. We also find that NTV prevented 
undecided voters from voting for the pro-government party criticized by NTV. Finally, we show 
that reading newspapers, better political knowledge, and higher education decreased the size of 
the NTV effect and that the effect of NTV was larger for retired individuals who watch more 
TV.  
Our results suggest that the media possesses a substantial power of political persuasion in 
countries characterized by weak democratic institutions such as Russia. By comparing our results 
  18with other findings in the literature, we conclude that the power of political persuasion of the 
media can be much larger in environments with weak democratic institutions than in established 
democracies. It would be too quick, however, to conclude that it is the case in any imperfect 
democracy or any other country at a similar stage of institutional development. Media effects in 
Russia are large due to the combination of such factors as the unstable party system, weak 
partisan attachments, the lack of prior information about the performance of politicians in office, 
unclear policy positions, the importance of valence or candidates' individual treats, and the lack 
of competitiveness in the media market. We expect media effects to be large in countries with all 
these conditions in place. Further research is needed to estimate the relative importance of these 
conditions and the magnitudes of media effects in other countries. 
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Figure 1. NTV signal availability in 1999 by subregion.   23
 
Figure 2. Vote for OVR (main centrist opposition party supported by NTV) by subregions, Russian parliamentary elections, 1999.   24
 
Figure 3. Vote for Unity (pro-government party opposed by NTV) by subregions, Russian parliamentary elections, 1999.   25
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics, socio-economic characteristics of subregions with and without 
NTV signal 
  NTV=0  NTV=1   Official  Results 
of Elections 




 Socio-economic  characteristics   
Population, thousands  35.68 32.98 1617 134.75 219.62 468 0.000***   
Population change  -0.28 2.27 1617 -0.33 2.64 468 0.711   
Migration rate, %  -0.06 1.26 1617 0.06 1.28 468 0.067*   
Average wage,  thousands of rubles  749.53 512.32 1629 1112.10 778.16 466 0.000***   
Average pension,  thousands of rubles  394.40 63.27 1486 417.78 70.54 435 0.000***   
Retired , %  25.76 10.61 1614 24.18 10.71 467 0.005***   
Unemployed, %  1.80 1.81 1617 1.77 1.62 468 0.724   
Population employed in farms, %  0.23 1.50 1617 0.31 1.87 468 0.412   
Crime rate, per 10000  163.48 223.05 1617 165.34 191.27 468 0.858   
  Vote in parliamentary elections in Duma, 1995   
Vote for KPRF (communist), %  26.49 12.07 1503 23.10 10.99 445 0.000***  22.30 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist), %  13.84 6.33 1503 12.15 5.81 445 0.000***  11.18 
Vote for NDR (pro-government), %  8.18 8.77 1503 9.36 5.62 445 0.001***  10.13 
Vote for Yabloko (liberal), %  2.96 2.64 1503 5.60 3.86 445 0.000***  6.89 
Democratic Russia's Choice (liberal), %  1.60 2.63 1503 2.89 2.96 445 0.000***  3.86 
Voter turnout, %  70.33 8.53 1503 64.40 7.89 445 0.000***  64.38 
  Vote in parliamentary elections in Duma, 1999   
Vote for Unity (centrist, pro-government), %  29.17 10.95 1792 24.10 10.88 531 0.000***  23.32 
Vote for OVR (centrist, opposition), %  9.62 14.59 1792 11.34 11.99 531 0.006***  13.33 
Vote for SPS (liberal), %  4.61 3.94 1792 7.59 3.83 531 0.000***  8.52 
Vote for Yabloko (liberal), % 2.60 2.10 1792 5.84 3.35 531 0.000***  5.93 
Vote for KPRF (communist), %  28.23 10.91 1792 24.48 9.50 531 0.000***  24.29 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist), % 7.24 3.17 1792 6.75 2.67 531 0.000***  5.98 
Voter turnout, %  63.98 9.85 1792 58.82 7.63 531 0.000***  61.85 
  Vote in parliamentary elections in Duma, 2003   
Vote for United Russia (centrist, pro-
government), % 
0.42 0.14 1768 0.39 0.11 510 0.000*** 37.57 
Vote for APR (Agrarian Party of Russia), %  0.06 0.06 1768 0.04 0.04 510 0.000*** 3.64 
Vote for SPS (Liberal), %  0.02 0.02 1768 0.03 0.02 510 0.000*** 3.97 
Vote for Yabloko (Liberal), %  0.02 0.01 1768 0.04 0.02 510 0.000*** 4.30 
Vote for KPRF (communist), %  0.14 0.06 1768 0.12 0.05 510 0.000*** 12.61 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist), %  0.12 0.05 1768 0.13 0.04 510 0.057* 11.45 
Voter turnout, %  0.61 0.12 1768 0.55 0.10 510 0.000*** 55.75   26
Table 2. Summary statistics. Intention to vote and reported vote, December 
1999 Duma elections. 
 Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  p-value  of 
difference 
 NTV=0  NTV=1   
Watches NTV  0.49 678 0.69 751 0.004*** 
Intention to vote for OVR (centrist, opposition)  0.08 433 0.16 536 0.000*** 
Intention to vote for Unity (centrist, pro-government)  0.12 433 0.10 536 0.440 
Intention to vote for SPS  (liberal)  0.08 433 0.07 536 0.670 
Intention to vote for Yabloko  (liberal)  0.05 433 0.14 536 0.000*** 
Intention to vote for KPRF  (communist)  0.42 433 0.23 536 0.000*** 
Intention to vote for LDPR (nationalist)  0.04 433 0.05 536 0.443 
Intended to participate in elections  0.88 685 0.89 776 0.616 
Vote for OVR (centrist, opposition)  0.07 572 0.11 586 0.059* 
Vote for Unity (centrist, pro-government)  0.30 572 0.24 586 0.129 
Vote for SPS (liberal)  0.05 572 0.14 586 0.002*** 
Vote for Yabloko (liberal)  0.04 572 0.08 586 0.022** 
Vote for KPRF (communist)  0.39 572 0.25 586 0.001*** 
Vote for LDPR (nationalist)  0.04 572 0.04 586 0.730 
Turnout   0.81 730 0.79 786 0.423 
Male  0.38 753 0.40 822 0.565 
Age  47.90 753 28.89 822 0.402 
Finished high school  0.74 751 0.81 819 0.023** 
Married  0.70 752 0.63 818 0.049** 
Consumption index  1.38 743 1.64 812 0.041** 
Political knowledge  6.64 753 6.49 822 0.179 
Reads newspapers  0.31 753 0.27 822 0.084* 
Listens to radio  0.31 753 0.39 822 0.004*** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Survey weights, designed to make the sample nationally representative, are used to construct this table.Table 3. Effect of NTV on voting behavior, aggregate data 
All variables are measured in percentages. Electoral controls include the results of Duma elections in December 1995, in particular vote for 
KPRF (Communists), vote for Yabloko, vote for NDR (Our Home is Russia),  vote for LDPR (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia), vote for 
Women of Russia, vote for Communists of USSR, vote for KRO (Congress of Russian Communities), vote for PST,  vote for DVR 
(Democratic Russia’s Choice), vote APR (Agrarian Party of Russia), vote “against all,” voter turnout. The set of socioeconomic controls 
includes log of population, population change, migration rate, log of average wage, average pension, fraction of retired people, fraction of 
unemployed, number of people employed in farms, crime rate. We do not have electoral controls for Taymyrsky AO and Nenetsky AO for 
1995, and this explains why specification with 1995 controls has 78 regions instead of 80. Robust standard errors clustered by region in 
brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  Opposed by NTV  Supported by NTV 
  Vote for Unity  
(centrist, pro-government) 
Vote for OVR 
(centrist, opposition) 
Vote for  SPS and Yabloko  
(liberal parties) 
NTV1999 -2.577  -2.5198  0.5457 0.5726 1.8154  1.5691 
 [0.5103]***  [0.5260]***  [0.2382]** [0.2497]** [0.2622]***  [0.2322]*** 
Electoral controls from 1995  No  Yes  No Yes No  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 1869  1568  1869 1568 1869  1568 
R-squared 0.67  0.68  0.79 0.82 0.76  0.84 
Number of regions  80  78  80 78 80  78 
            
  No bias by NTV   
  Vote for KPRF 
(communist) 
Vote for LDPR 
(nationalist) 
Voter turnout 
NTV1999 0.1081  0.2368  -0.1949  -0.1867  -0.6489  -0.4218 
 [0.3761]  [0.2979]  [0.1280]  [0.1142]  [0.3064]**  [0.2620] 
Electoral controls from 1995  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1869  1568  1869  1568  1869  1568 
R-squared 0.73  0.82  0.73 0.78 0.68  0.8 
Number of regions  80  78  80  78  80  78 
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Table 4. Correlates of availability of NTV signal in 1999. 
  Availability of NTV signal in 1999 (0 or 1) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Vote for KPRF (Communists) in 1995, %  0.001  0.0006  0.0009  -0.0005 
 [0.0026]  [0.0021]  [0.0027]  [0.0022] 
Vote for LDPR (Nationalist) in 1995, %  -0.0009  0.0005  -0.0036  -0.0018 
 [0.0032]  [0.0025]  [0.0034]  [0.0026] 
Vote for NDR (Pro-government) in 1995, %  0.0014  0.0011  -0.0005  -0.0017 
 [0.0027]  [0.0023]  [0.0029]  [0.0025] 
Vote for Yabloko (Liberal) in 1995, %  0.0213  0.001  -0.003  -0.008 
 [0.0072]***  [0.0045]  [0.0075]  [0.0047]* 
Vote for Women of Russia in 1995, %  -0.0053  0.0036  0.0057  0.0064 
 [0.0074]  [0.0052]  [0.0092]  [0.0066] 
Vote for Communists of USSR in 1995, %  0.0027  -0.0005  0.0054  0.0005 
 [0.0051]  [0.0041]  [0.0054]  [0.0042] 
Vote for KRO (Nationalist) in 1995, %  0.0199  0.0096  0.0101  0.007 
 [0.0079]**  [0.0054]*  [0.0083]  [0.0059] 
Vote for PST (Centrist) in 1995, %  0.0281  0.0212  0.0103  0.013 
 [0.0100]***  [0.0064]*** [0.0104]  [0.0066]** 
Democratic Russia's Choice (Liberal), %  0.0069  0.0016  -0.0022  -0.0041 
 [0.0061]  [0.0057]  [0.0065]  [0.0064] 
Vote for APR (Agrarian Party of Russia) in 
1995, %  -0.0019  -0.0016  0.0005  -0.0022 
 [0.0027]  [0.0021]  [0.0029]  [0.0023] 
Vote against all in 1995, %  0.01  0.0068  0.0181  0.0058 
 [0.0125]  [0.0091]  [0.0159]  [0.0114] 
Voter turnout in 1995, %  -0.0057  -0.0021  0.0007  0.001 
 [0.0016]***  [0.0012]*  [0.0019]  [0.0015] 
Availability of NTV in 1997    0.745    0.7222 
   [0.0229]***   [0.0278]***
Ln (Population), 1998      0.2063  0.0715 
     [0.0162]***  [0.0139]***
Population change, 1998      -0.0058  -0.001 
     [0.0053]  [0.0018] 
Migration rate, 1998      0.0025  -0.0027 
     [0.0090]  [0.0075] 
Ln(Average wage),  1998      0.1383  -0.1369 
     [0.4385]  [0.2765] 
Average pension, in  thousands of rubles, 1998      0.0151  0.0374 
     [0.0455]  [0.0297] 
Fraction of retired people, 1998      -0.0018  -0.0015 
     [0.0022]  [0.0012] 
Fraction of unemployed, 1998      0.0115  -0.0057 
     [0.0078]  [0.0055] 
Fraction of population employed in farms, 1998      0.0085  -0.0004 
     [0.0112]  [0.0062] 
Crime rate, 1998      0.0001  0.000 
     [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 1948  1948  1568  1568 
R-squared 0.30  0.68  0.38  0.69 
F-statistics, electoral variables 14.99  5.28  0.85  1.33 
F-statistic, socioeconomic variables      20.15  4.56 
Linear probability model. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Size of the sample 
shrinks to 1568 in the last two specifications because of some missing socioeconomic data for subregions.   29
Table 5. Placebo regressions for the elections of 1995. 
  Vote for NDR 
(pro-government) 
Vote for Democratic 
Russia’s choice 
(liberal) 
Vote for Yabloko 
(liberal) 
NTV1999  -0.3654  -0.1368  -0.2291 -0.0499 -0.0802 0.0354 
  [0.3426]  [0.2292]  [0.3774] [0.1657] [0.1890] [0.1841] 
Socioeconomic controls from 1996  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Socioeconomic controls from 1998  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Regional  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 848  1568  848  1568  848  1568 
R-squared  0.58  0.59  0.56 0.59 0.75 0.77 
Number of regions  46  78  46  78  46  78 
          
  Vote for KPRF 
(communist) 
Vote for LDPR 
(nationalist) 
Voter turnout 
NTV1999 -0.2961  -0.017  -0.0456 -0.5115 -0.7811 0.0188 
 [0.7046]  [0.4892]  [0.4207] [0.3425] [0.8235] [0.5551] 
Socioeconomic controls from 1996  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Socioeconomic controls from 1998  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Regional  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  848  1568  848 848 848 1568 
R-squared 0.78  0.73  0.62 0.64 0.58 0.63 
Number of regions  46  78  46  78  46  78 
All variables are measured in percentages.  The set of socioeconomic controls includes log of population, population change, 
migration rate, log of average wage, average pension, fraction of retired people, fraction of unemployed, number of people 
employed in farms, crime rate. Unfortunately, the data on socioeconomic characteristics of subregions prior to 1996 is not 
available, and the coverage for 1996 is very limited. For this reason we report the results controlling for the characteristics both 
in 1996 and in 1998. The tables shows that the coefficients for NTV  remain insignificant regardless of the set of controls we 
use. Robust standard errors clustered by region in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. Placebo regressions for the elections of 2003. 
  Vote for United Russia 
(pro-government, centrist, 
formed as the alliance of 
OVR and Unity) 
Vote for APR 
(agrarian) 
Vote for SPS and 
Yabloko  
(liberal parties) 
NTV1999  -0.0002 0.0074  -0.0008  0.0013  0.0052 -0.0015 
  [0.0060]  [0.0061]  [0.0022] [0.0021] [0.0018]***  [0.0013] 
Electoral controls from 1999  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls from  1998 Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Regional  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  1833  1833  1833 1833 1833  1833 
R-squared  0.72  0.78  0.66 0.68 0.66  0.77 
Number of regions  80  80  80 80 80  80 
           
  Vote for KPRF 
(communist) 
Vote for LDPR 
(nationalist) 
Voter turnout 
NTV1999  -0.0041  -0.0034  -0.0035 -0.0006 -0.0028  0.0023 
  [0.0030]  [0.0029]  [0.0022] [0.0017] [0.0042]  [0.0038] 
Electoral controls from 1999  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls from  1998 Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Regional  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  1833  1833  1833 1833 1833  1833 
R-squared  0.59  0.72  0.76 0.84 0.73  0.84 
Number of regions  80  80  80 80 80  80 
All variables are measured in percentages.  Electoral controls from 1999 include the results of Duma elections in December 1999, 
in particular vote for OVR, vote for Unity, vote for SPS, vote for Yabloko, vote for KPRF, vote for LDPR, vote “against all,” voter 
turnout. The set of socioeconomic controls includes log of population, population change, migration rate, log of average wage, 
average pension, fraction of retired people, fraction of unemployed, number of people employed in farms, crime rate.  Robust 
standard errors clustered by region in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   31
Table 7. Individual-level results. The first stage estimation. 
 Watches  NTV 
  OLS Probit  OLS Probit 
Availability of NTV in 1999  0.1997 0.5616 0.1435 0.4062 
  [0.0485]*** [0.1355]*** [0.0555]*** [0.1547]***
Sex (1 if male)  0.0658 0.2008 0.0336 0.111 
  [0.0355]* [0.1043]* [0.0436]  [0.1236] 
Age  -0.0021 -0.0062 -0.0019 -0.0056 
  [0.0012]* [0.0034]* [0.0015]  [0.0041] 
Finished high school  0.0721 0.1856 0.1032 0.2676 
  [0.0486] [0.1347] [0.0561]*  [0.1546]* 
Marital status (1 if married)  0.0298 0.0804 0.037  0.0988 
  [0.0373] [0.1068] [0.0459] [0.1264] 
Consumption index  0.0271 0.0857 0.03  0.0911 
  [0.0128]** [0.0395]** [0.0157]*  [0.0465]* 
Ln (population), 1998  -0.0424 -0.1513 -0.0535 -0.1767 
  [0.0151]*** [0.0504]*** [0.0195]*** [0.0640]***
Ln (Average wage)  0.193 0.6572  0.2458  0.7975 
  [0.0435]*** [0.1625]*** [0.0574]*** [0.2128]***
Intention to vote for OVR in 1999    0.0521  0.1299 
    [0.0789]  [0.2195] 
Intention to vote for KPRF in 1999    0.1147  0.3295 
    [0.0647]*  [0.1790]* 
Intention to vote for Unity in 1999    0.0825  0.2275 
    [0.0781]  [0.2155] 
Intention to vote for Yabloko in 1999    0.0709  0.202 
    [0.0808]  [0.2330] 
Intention to vote for LDPR in 1999    0.0278  0.0523 
    [0.1217]  [0.3246] 
Intention to vote for SPS in 1999    0.1055  0.2934 
    [0.0912]  [0.2617] 
Intention to vote against all in 1999    -0.0628  -0.1758 
    [0.1050]  [0.2748] 
Observations  901 901 656 656 
R-squared  0.11   0.10  
F-statistics  for the exclusion of NTV1999  16.97   6.69   
χ2 statistics for the exclusion of NTV1999   17.18   6.90 
Robust standard errors in brackets,  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%  Availability of NTV alone explains 7% of variation in 
NTV exposure. Survey weights are used to make the sample nationally 
representative.  32
Table 8. Reported vote and NTV. 





SPS and Yabloko 
 (Liberal) 
  IV probit  Probit  IV probit  Probit  IV probit  Probit 
Watches  NTV  -1.1887  -0.1385  1.8467 0.1347 0.464  0.2125 
  [0.5290]**  [0.1284] [0.3383]***  [0.1545] [1.0862] [0.1694] 
Marginal  effect  -0.42  -0.05  0.45 0.02 0.09 0.04 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  901 901 901 901 901 901 
Number  of  subregions  41 41 41 41 41 41 
χ2 statistics for the exclusion of  
NTV1999 in the first stage  17.12   17.12   17.12  
        






  IV probit  Probit  IV probit  Probit  IV probit  Probit 
Watches  NTV  -0.7144 0.0518  -1.0177 -0.1001 0.9397  0.9397 
  [0.5143] [0.1095] [1.1215] [0.1391] [0.9350] [0.9350] 
Marginal  effect  -0.25 0.02  -0.13 -0.01 0.27  0.27 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  901 901 901 901 1148  1148 
Number  of  subregions  41 41 41 41 41 41 
χ2 statistics for the exclusion of  
NTV1999 in the first stage  17.12   17.12   21.92  
Probit model. In the IV regressions Watched NTV variable from the pre-election survey is instrumented by the presence of NTV dummy. Observations are weighted by 
sample survey weights. Vector of controls includes  dummy variables for sex, age, marital status, education, consumption index, logarithm of subregional population and 
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Table 9. Reported vote controlling for intention to vote and for undecided voters. 
  Opposed by NTV  Supported by NTV 




SPS and Yabloko 
 (Liberal) 
  Full sample  Undecided Only  Full sample  Undecided Only  Full sample  Undecided Only 
Watched NTV  -0.5781  -1.3069 1.9148 0.6178 0.3631 0.6789 
  [1.1488] [0.4701]***  [0.2125]***  [1.0290] [1.6358] [0.9573] 
Marginal  effect  -0.19  -0.47 0.51 0.07 0.04 0.13 
Intention to vote  Yes No  Yes No Yes No 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  656 245 578 245 656 245 
Number of subregions  41 39 41 39 41 39 
χ2 statistics for the exclusion of  
NTV1999 in the first stage  6.84  21.13 5.96 21.13 2.87  21.13 
        






  Full sample  Undecided Only  Full sample  Full sample  Full sample  Undecided Only 
Watched NTV  -1.5878 0.3965  -1.8251 1.1256 -0.8625 0.8381 
 [0.7172]**  [0.7032]  [0.3755]*** [0.5103]**  [1.1745]  [0.5324] 
Marginal  effect  -0.56 0.11  -0.49 0.1  -0.17 0.3 
Intention to vote  Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  631 245 656 245 764 384 
Number of subregions  41 39 41 39 41 39 
χ2 statistics for the exclusion of  
NTV1999 in the first stage  3.89 21.13  6.84 21.13  7.1  21.83 
Probit model. Watched NTV variable form the post-election survey instrumented by the presence of NTV dummy. In columns marked “Undecided only”  only respondents that did not 
report their intention to vote in the pre-election survey are included in the sample. Observations are weighted by sample survey weights. Vector of controls includes sex, age, marital status, 
education, consumption index, logarithm of subregional population and logarithm of average wage in subregion. Controls for intention to vote include dummy variables for intention to 
vote for  6  major parties and “Against all.” Robust standard errors clustered by subregion in brackets.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   34
Table 10. Effect of NTV on reported vote interacted with individual characteristics. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
























Reads Newspapers× NTV  -0.4944 0.4711            
  [0.2597]* [0.2368]**            
Reads Newspapers  0.3901 -0.4486            
  [0.1964]** [0.1511]***           
Listens to Radio× NTV      0.2578 0.0278         
     [0.3012] [0.1978]         
Listens to Radio      -0.1315 -0.0634         
     [0.2126] [0.1522]         
Political  Knowledge×  NTV      -0.1165 0.054        
      [0.0650]* [0.0433]        
Political  Knowledge      0.1226 -0.0448        
      [0.0576]** [0.0312]        
Finished  high  school×  NTV        -0.7317 -0.1546     
        [0.4399]* [0.2627]      
Finished  high  school        0.4024 -0.0026      
        [0.4140] [0.1837]     
R e t i r e d ×     N T V
e t i r e d
N T V
g e - 1 8
        0.5598 0.2861   
          [0.2598]** [0.2240]    
R           -0.233 -0.1767    
          [0.2232] [0.2546]   
( A g e - 1 8 ) ×               0.0273 0.0105 
            [0.0081]*** [0.0065] 
A             -0.0159 -0.0216 
            [0.0073]** [0.0052]*** 
NTV  0.869 -0.4143  0.5777  -0.2781  1.573 -0.6672  1.2657  -0.1463 0.5035  -0.346  -0.1148 -0.5682 
  [0.2360]*** [0.1429]*** [0.2349]**  [0.1197]** [0.5063]*** [0.3195]**  [0.3899]***  [0.2604]  [0.1974]** [0.1445]** [0.3024]  [0.2135]*** 
All regressions contain 901 observations, cover 41 subregions, and include all control variables of the individual-level regressions. In  particular, the vector of controls includes  dummy variables for sex, age, marital status, 
education, consumption index, logarithm of subregional population and logarithm of average wage in subregion. Robust standard errors clustered by subregion in brackets. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%   